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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEACETIME DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES



by
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

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Abstract of

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The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the promulgation of the New National Security Strategy, has fostered new implications for the peacetime deployment of naval forces. The traditional missions of deterrence and crisis response are no longer adequate in completely describing today's deployment requirements. The mission of Forward Presence demands the political significance of naval power be restored to routine deployment concepts. Research and conclusions do not include strategic deterrent missions, or take into account readiness, training, or quality of life issues. Yet, several deployment objectives are developed and used to propose a new deployment scheme. Deployment operations fall into two distinct categories - deliberate and responsive. Deliberate operations are driven by the nation's security policy and assert unilateral U-S interests, affirm multi-lateral commitments, enhance regional stability, and promote free democratic principles. Responsive operations respond to crises and marshal capability. These findings permit changes to recently promulgated deployment concepts, and more effectively employ appropriate naval forces.



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**THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT:
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The Soviet Union is finished. For nearly a half-century, U-S Navy peacetime deployments were concentrated in areas 'where American and Soviet interests overlapped at likely points of crisis.'¹ More importantly, deployments were conducted to position U-S naval forces for the possibility of global war with the Soviet Union. These ordinary deployments produced awesome - yet strangely routine - images. The night launch of carrier-based strike aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea, 'the dawn movement ashore of amphibious assault forces on the Korean peninsula, and the simultaneous refueling and rearming of cruisers and destroyers in the North Arabian Sea are just a few. But beyond the counterbalance to Soviet influence, these traditional images express the very essence of superior U-S maritime power. The ability to conduct global, sustained operations at sea - as a matter of routine - rests solely with the United States Navy.

But how, and where, should this maritime capability be applied in peacetime in the new multi-polar world? In April 1991, the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Frank B. Kelso, challenged the navy's traditional deployment patterns as 'wedded too closely to the concept of an Armageddon at sea with the Soviet Union', and called for deployment 'operations in broader, less rigid zones of national interest.'² In September, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), GEN Colin L. Powell responded to the President's New National Security Strategy (NSS) and unveiled the 'Base Force' concept. In it, the Chairman



directed the presence of one CVBG and one ARG in each of the European, Western Pacific, and Southwest Asia areas.³

Hold it!

This is the new operating concept for deployments? This seems very familiar - if not more restrictive - than the old deployment concept.[†] Further, the need to maintain forward deployed forces is framed strictly in the crisis action and deterrent force context. Whether one favors the new deployment scheme or not, the utility of routine deployments must be questioned if the patterns remain relatively unchanged.

Should U-S naval forces continue a forward-deployed posture? Clearly, yes. Their potential combat value is implicit; deployments in likely areas of crisis and national interest enhance the nation's security. Further, these operations enhance readiness and training. Yet, the political value of routine deployments has been forgotten. The traditional missions of deterrence and crisis response are no longer adequate in completely describing today's forward presence requirements. New emphasis must be placed on the development of peacetime applications. In turn, these concepts should serve as the foundation of the deployment planning process, and new deployment patterns and concepts should be implemented.

[†]. In fact, the continued presence of the ATG in Southwest Asia (SWA) is an increase in previous amphibious presence requirements. Formerly, SWA amphibious presence was filled periodically by either the MED or WPAC ARG, and was routinely waived.



TRADITIONAL USES OF MARITIME POWER

Crisis response and deterrence. Modern theorists have used these concepts as the fundamental tenets of deployment reasoning for a half-century. Some maintain the aero-success of Desert Storm has obviated the traditional need for on-call naval forces. However, in the absence of both a Saudi invitation, and an established airbase infra-structure, naval power projection forces would have been the most crucial combat assets from the initial crisis response phase through the conflict's ultimate resolution. It is difficult to challenge the value of deployments in this regard. Any history of the uses of maritime power supports the utility and effectiveness of naval forces in crisis response. Naval forces are coveted for their...

'calculated ambiguity and calibrated response. Their presence on the high seas does not commit [nations] to a given course of action. They can remain...indefinitely, over the horizon, unseen...ready to operate at varying orders of magnitude'.

Clearly, the freedom of the high seas, and the independence from host-nation or other basing considerations, will continue to make naval forces a fundamental choice in crisis situations.

Additionally, the need for deterrence has been, and will remain central to modern strategy; 'force sufficient to convince adversaries that the cost of aggression will exceed any possible gain' will continue to be a deployment tenet.⁵ This holdover from former bi-polar strategies must be used to deter the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction, prevent the closure of critical sea lines of communication, and limit



aggression in critical areas. The use of naval forces for this mission is also difficult to question. After all, the Cold War was partially won through the employment of naval forces in strategic and conventional deterrence missions.

Yet, these tenets embody only the manifestation of combat power or the threat of its use. Indeed, few modern theorists value the political uses of peacetime deployments. Some view the routine deployment of naval forces as merely a 'pre-positioning' concept. Sir James Cable for example, gives little credence to 'naval movements, visits, and exercises' as a policy instrument, 'if no one regards them as threatening'.⁶ In his view, the ability to exert political influence occurs only when an act of force, or the threat of its use, actually occurs.

Other theorists abhor some deployment aspects for their paradoxical nature. Edward Luttwak claims the latent effects of routine deployments are unpredictable, as the reactions evoked by such movements may be threatening to some when no threat is intended.⁷ Here, there is no accurate means to control the persuasive power of routine deployments. The implication of both Cable's and Luttwak's arguments is forward deployed naval forces have little measureable political or diplomatic value *prior to crises*. The Navy itself perpetuates this concept by pointedly enumerating the crises responded to during the last decade as a meaningful measure of effectiveness.

Although relevant, these theories are somewhat baffling. Mahan would be shocked. After all, Mahan was 'not a theorist of



combat strategy, but rather the great elucidator of the political significance of naval power."⁸ Before the rise of the Soviet threat, naval forces were deployed precisely for this reason. In today's multi-polar world, the political significance of deployments must be rediscovered. This challenge is apparent.

NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS


The development of the New National Security Strategy demands - of itself - the demonstration of political power through deployments. New diplomatic opportunities have emerged. If 'containment' personified the nation's Cold War policy, then the phrase 'vigilant engagement' expresses the nation's new security policy. There is no Soviet-like global influence to be considered in every foreign policy or crisis situation today. As the world's sole superpower, the ability to develop cohesive, interactive foreign policies prior to crises should be within the nation's grasp.

The stated interests and objectives outlined in the new NSS are succinct; 'the survival of the U-S...a healthy and growing U-S economy...vigorous relations with allies...and a stable and secure world' form the basis of national interest.⁹ The phrase 'vigilant engagement' is derived from the proactive, stabilizing methods in which the President seeks to attain these policy objectives. 'Engagement' is evident in the document's repeated use of words such as *promote, foster, ensure, strengthen, support, aid, and maintain*, to those objectives supportive of our



national interests. 'Vigilance' is present in the President's use of *deter, counter, reduce, and prevent* to those objects and problems counter to U-S interests. Nevertheless, all of these terms connote deliberate interaction with allies or adversaries. 'Vigilant engagement' is simply a matter of winning the peace. Arguably, the wartime necessity to integrate policy, strategy, and the operational art should also apply here; to 'win the peace', peacetime employment of naval forces must support the nation's policy and strategy.

'Vigilant engagement's' resulting defense strategic elements thus lead deployment concepts. In short, these strategic elements are: Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Force Reconstitution. The routine deployment of naval surface forces is effected by three of these strategic elements. As before, the conventional or nuclear deterrent capability of peacetime deployments has been demonstrated for 45 years. Further, forward deployed forces are credible crisis response assets. Again, these concepts remain relatively unchanged from the Soviet-centric strategic elements of yesterday. However, forward presence has replaced the concept of forward defense, and is fundamentally a new mission.¹⁰ Further, the President has set a distinctive tone; 'maintaining a positive influence in distant regions requires that we demonstrate our *engagement*.'¹¹ Clearly, the national resolve indicates it is time to bring ships in from over the horizon.



NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

'Vigilant engagement' then, requires peacetime deployments be oriented for peace and war. Yet, furthering the peacetime objectives of the Nation, as well as providing a credible deterrent and crisis response force, is not an entirely new concept. Naval strategists grappled with the 'mission' of Naval Presence when the nation's security strategy transitioned to detente during the early 1970's. Stansfield Turner separated peacetime deployments into two categories: preventive and reactive. His definitions of each were concise. Preventive deployments initiated a show of presence in peacetime. Reactive deployments responded to crises.¹² Ken Booth's three levels of analysis divided deployment operations into policing, diplomatic, and military roles. The policing role was used to preserve the state's maritime frontier. The diplomatic role supported foreign policy short of actual employment of force. The military role applied force, or at the very least, threatened its use.¹³ These efforts, and others, possess enduring principles which still apply today. However, with today's proactive guidance from the NSS, these categories do not fully personify today's deployment requirements.

Peacetime deployment operations now fall into two distinct, yet complementary, components: *deliberate* and *responsive*. Deliberate operations are inspired by policy, and employed prior to crises specifically to demonstrate the nation's engagement. They implicitly serve the nation's interests. Further,



deliberate deployment operations are enabling; they may become responsive operations. Responsive operations are similar to Turner's reactive operations; they react to crises and marshal capability. Naturally, these operations are typically used to threaten or use force. Also, they may be used simply to signal U-S interest, concern, or support in an ad hoc policy situation. Additionally, they can provide emergency relief following hurricanes, earthquakes, or other natural disasters. Yet, as opposed to the political foundation of deliberate operations, responsive operations are fundamentally characterized by the vagueries inherent to crises.

These deployment roles are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Routine deployments have embraced both roles during the last decade, and will continue to do so. However, if deliberate activities are astutely planned, the need for responsive operations can be diminished.¹⁴ Accordingly, several principles of deliberate operations should be adhered to in developing new deployment concepts.¹⁵

First, deliberate deployment operations should *assert unilateral U-S interest in areas of continuing national concern*.¹⁵ This activity concerns areas with which the U-S has either a leadership role, or an exclusive interest. The free-flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz is an interest of most nations, yet U-S concern in ensuring free markets, and U-S status

¹⁴. Many of these principles are consistent regardless of author. A comprehensive listing is enclosed in Appendix I.



as the sole superpower, makes leadership in this regard axiomatic. Conversely, the "war" against the illicit use of drugs is a concern of almost national exclusivity. In either case, U-S interests may independently establish the pace and standard for these operations. Further, execution of this task need not be in concert with allies, or subject to international scrutiny. It is subject only to the will of U-S policymakers.

Second, routine deployment should *affirm multi-lateral commitments*. This task has several forms. It can be used to reaffirm established military alliances, or foster new ones. It can confirm political friendships and demonstrate multi-national resolve. It might provide stability to nations threatened by insurrection. This task may be fulfilled by evolutions as simple as goodwill port visits, or as complex as multi-carrier battle force exercises. It may manifest itself in continued UNITAS or STANAVFORLANT commitments. In any event, evolutions of this type foster new, or continued political-military relationships, and are inherently international in character.

Third, deliberate deployments should *enhance regional stability*. This task deters aggression, and supports friendly nations. It may be used to alter the behavior of a long-standing opponent. This is perhaps the most difficult activity to implement; much of the effects are either immeasurable, or largely dependent on the perception of U-S intentions. Indeed, this task can be destabilizing if forces are belatedly injected into a crisis.¹⁶ Yet, emphasis on continuity can preserve the



power balance in areas marked by continued instability.

Fourth, deliberate deployment operations should *promote free democratic principles*. This activity supports burgeoning, or struggling countries through humanitarian assistance, military advice, and security training. It may assist in assuring human rights, social progress, and free trade. Nation-building would not be an inaccurate description. This activity can manifest itself through small bi-lateral exchanges, goodwill port visits, and Navy-Marine Corps demonstrations. Security training, minor construction projects, and military to military discussions may be common highlights. The potential returns are enormous. Access to fishing rights, technology transfer, low-level training flights, and even the pre-positioning of stocks may result. Most importantly, this activity may prevent creation of a future foe.

Clearly, deployment concepts which adhere to these deliberate principles emphasize the political significance of naval power. Yet, planning cannot ignore the requirements of the responsive role. The ability to respond to crises - with appropriate capabilities - must also remain central to operational concepts. The embodiment of both roles fulfills the whole of the deployment task - deterrence, crisis response, and forward presence.

CONCEPTS TO APPLICATIONS

The transition from concept to application is important. After all, the significance is lost if applications are insufficient or inappropriate. Yet, there are limitations



inherent to the employment of naval forces, their political usefulness, and the operational requirements of the NSS. The deliberate and responsive concepts discussed above must recognize these crucial limitations.

First, global power does not equate to global interest. The NSS is succinct in this manner. Clearly, areas of national interest - and not all areas of the globe - must frame deployment operations in practice. The U-S commitment to European security, the continued free-flow of oil from the Middle East, the preservation of democratic nations in the Western Pacific and the Western Hemisphere, are primary areas of national interest subject to naval force applications. Additionally, these areas have historically been the most susceptible to crises. Ninety percent of all regional crises in the last half-century have occurred in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, northern Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific littoral areas. Extensive naval operations in the South Pacific, South Atlantic, and Baltic areas then, are perhaps less appropriate. Those proponents of Great White Fleet cruises to areas of dubious national interest are enamored with naval tradition, not practical political power.

Additionally, effective sea control enables effective power projection. The scramble to remain entrenched in regional strategies has placed new, and enormous emphasis on the power projection capabilities of naval forces. Yet, without control of the sea, power projection is impossible. Obviously, the oceans are relatively unchallenged by other navies. Few blue water



navies can even remotely challenge the U-S Navy in open-ocean warfare. However, several strategic sea lines of communication can be denied with relatively unsophisticated forces. These areas are easily identified - the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Straits of Mallacca, the Straits of Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the approaches to the Central American isthmus are all areas subject to rapid sea denial by hostile forces. Thus, it is hardly axiomatic to conclude that a reduction in escorts for carrier and amphibious groups is appropriate. The CVBG and ARG should remain the central building block for deployed forces. However, adequate escorts must be in place to enhance sea control capabilities under a variety of threats.

Finally, naval peacetime presence of itself does not necessarily constitute political interaction. Over-the-horizon forces are invisible to nations without adequate intelligence. Thus, their political usefulness is nil unless forces are either within the horizon, or acknowledged to be present. Luttwak's affirmation that 'naval power must be perceived' is entirely correct.¹⁷ Submarines always have deterrent value if their presence is known, but they can have no other effect unless they are employed interactively. Clearly, the independent deployment of submarines in counter-strategic force roles is still appropriate. Further, independent submarine operations may still be appropriate in conflict or crisis response. Covert operations, and stealth capability, have continued application in



this regard. But in peacetime, their political value is zero unless they interact with other forces. Additionally, some aspects of U-S naval power can be overwhelming. Third world navies are probably awed by carrier aviation and the power projection capability of U-S amphibious ready groups - but may have little need to understand such operations or capabilities. Basic surface action group (SAG) interactions may be more appropriate.

Clearly, these inherent limitations assist in framing the specifics of the deployment planning problem. The need to maintain readiness, conduct effective combat training, and implement appropriate operating tempos, are also pertinent factors. The challenge is to balance requirements against limitations in the development of deployment patterns and capabilities.

A DEPLOYMENT PROPOSAL

The post-Cold War deployment requirements promulgated by the Base Force concept and regional commanders are succinct.

Mediterranean and Southwest Asia 'coverage' is extensive. In the aftermath of Desert Storm, one CVBG, one ATG, the Middle East Force (MEF), and the Red Sea Maritime Interception Force (RSMIF) remain on station in the Southwest Asia region. In the Mediterranean, one CVBG must be on-station a vast preponderance of every calendar year. Additionally, the Mediterranean ARG is on-station. Surface Action and Maritime Action Group concepts



have also been developed to provide additional Mediterranean 'coverage'.

Western Pacific force requirements are relatively unchanged. One CVBG and one ARG remain central to deployed force planning. Of note, the CVBG is permanently stationed overseas in Western Pacific ports. Further, the ARG can be centrally structured around forward-based assets.

The remaining Atlantic and Pacific naval forces are assigned to the Contingency Forces role and are essentially CONUS based.

Yet, despite the call for smaller, flexible battle groups, the innovative deployment patterns, and the employment of SAGs and MAGs, this deployment plan employs limited effective naval power. Deliberate operations which demonstrate the positive political uses of deployed forces are not consistently evident.

In the combined MEDITERRANEAN and SOUTHWEST ASIA areas, emphasis on regional threats has clouded the ability to analyze the larger impact. Three separate Unified Commands (EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM) are employing forces in, or adjacent to, these two regions. The result? Force levels are too high in what is essentially the Middle East region because of false constraints. Further, there is little constructive political return for the number of assets employed. MED forces interact frequently with multi-national forces, but SWA assets do not. The SWA CVBG and ARG assets are fundamentally deterrent and crisis response force assets. They are clearly demonstrative of U-S interest in the Middle East, but provide little other



political value. MEF and RSMIF forces on the other hand, continue to enforce United Nations sanctions by intercepting illegal goods potentially bound for Iraq. The critical need for Mediterranean power projection forces is in the Eastern Med for similar reason - to protect Europe from Middle Eastern regional instability. Yet, in the coverage concept, SWA forces may be as far away as Diego Garcia, and Mediterranean forces may be in WMED, and little immediate crisis response force is available. The end result is nearly twice the assets are on-station for similar purpose, and with little coordination.

A more appropriate 'coverage' scheme in these two regions would be to ignore the false regional constraints caused by 'CINCdoms' and the Suez Canal, and modify the force levels in the MED/SWA region as follows.

1. Maintain one CVBG and one ARG in the EMED, Red Sea, or North Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf area continuously. This rotating scheme maintains significant power projection forces in the Middle East region permanently, and provides credible deterrent and crisis response assets.

2. Maintain sufficient carrier and amphibious group escorts to enhance regional political interaction. Clearly, the CVBG and ARG must remain the central deployment 'building block' due to their power projection capability. Further, independent SAGs and MAGs (other than the MEF) have little utility unless they can rapidly detach and rejoin CVBG and ATG operations. Tomahawk capable forces are important, but in all reality, they provide



little flexibility and punch in a crisis. Yet, escort utility in this region is extremely high and cannot be ignored. Other nations possess escort and Coast Guard sized assets only, and gain much through bi-lateral and multi-lateral exercises. Patrol, escort, and interdiction operations are routine. Further, port visits in many of these areas are possible only by escort-sized vessels, and may be the only way to maintain U-S visibility. The reduction to one ARG and one CVBG would allow escort levels to be maintained in a manner which best supports the political realities of the region.

3. Maintain one aircraft carrier, and one ARG in a responsive surge role. These assets cannot be in CONUS waters. A shared duty scheme between Atlantic and Pacific forces, and a response time of 10-14 days (on-station) should be delineated. Further, escorts should be minimized. A carrier responding to the Gulf area may take one or two cruisers, and then be augmented by the standing MEF. This scheme would marshal appropriate capability quickly, and still provide extensive flexibility in operations outside the Southwest Asia, and Eastern Mediterranean areas.

4. Rely on multi-national forces for smaller problems. For instance, the use of NAVOCFORMED in the WMED may be an effective counter to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria and Tunisia. Further, Gulf nations must take a more active interest in shipping security in the Gulf region. MEF operating concepts must reduce its own patrol and escort mindset, and begin to train



GCC countries in these duties.

Clearly, this scheme could marshall the same combat power in a similar timeframe with increased flexibility and deliberate interaction. Regional security is maintained, multi-national cooperation is fostered, and U-S interest is demonstrated in a more global sense.

Of course, the glaring disadvantage is the reduction in response time to the Gulf area if the CVBG or ARG is in EMED. This is indisputable, yet as before astute planning may forego the need to execute crisis response. This is one of the basic tenets of forward presence and the deliberate role. An interactive MEF, coupled with more frequent and comprehensive exercises in the Gulf or Northern Arabian Sea areas when the CVBG is present, will reduce the possibility of crises occurring.

Additionally, little credence can be given to the 'power vacuum' myth. There is no measure to prove this theory. Indeed, U-S forces have been present in the Middle East Region for forty years. Yet, crises occur again and again. Clearly, this is not due to our lack of interest or frequent departures from the area. Operations in this region have been insufficient in enhancing regional security, and will continue to be so, unless they assume a more deliberate 'engagement' role.

Finally, there may be coordination difficulties between regional CINCs in this deployment scheme. However, a careful review of regional demands as they relate to global requirements is precisely what's needed to solve the force level problem. The



concentration on regional threats has destroyed the strategic global view. Europe and the Middle East are both threatened by common socio-religious instabilities in the Middle East and East African regions. An independent review of global political requirements by the JCS can mediate this deployment scheme and preempt regional CINC demands for unneeded forces.

In the WESTERN PACIFIC region, more emphasis must be placed on operations in Southeast Asia. The permanent presence of joint forces in Korea and Japan makes the flexible employment of naval forces in southern regions possible. Further, the withdrawal of U-S forces from the Philippines, and continued instability in Cambodia, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asia areas demands the mobile power projection capability of the ARG and CVBG. However, demonstrated engagement must serve as the basis for deployment operations.

Concentrated multi-national operations and exercises, including extensive security assistance training, must be continued. Marine forces capable of training international forces in counter-narcotic and counter-terrorist methods should be included in the MEU(SOC) team. Periodic deployments of Constuction Battalion teams in amphibious ship detachments may promote democratic freedoms and principles in remote Asian regions. Light construction equipment, and enthusiastic Seabees can make significant contributions to impoverished areas at little cost. Of course, extensive host-country and U-S political liaison must occur to effectively implement this scheme.



Frequent political reassessments must also occur. Yet, the potential benefits may be enormous. In this large ocean area, over-the-horizon forces have little impact. They must be employed where political stabilities can be directly enhanced.

Additionally, disaster relief is a frequent responsive requirement in this area. Pre-staged equipment in Japan and Guam may simplify the disaster relief effort. Watermakers, pre-packaged food, and construction equipment suitable for shipping should be standard line items.

Finally, battle force level operations must be frequently exercised. Multi-carrier and MEB-sized amphibious groups may be required in either the Southeast Asian or Korean peninsulas in times of crisis. Pacific JFACC duties are most likely to be assumed by Navy commanders in this essentially maritime theater. Renewed emphasis must be placed on the integrated employment of carrier and amphibious groups in scenarios outside the Korean peninsula.

In OTHER areas of the globe similar interactive, nation-building efforts are required. The routine deployment of UNITAS and STANAVFORLANT forces enhances interoperability, and demonstrates continued interest in South American, and North Atlantic areas, respectively. These should be continued despite the reduction in force levels. Periodic operations with carrier-forces should be adopted for STANAVFORLANT units. The multinational character of Desert Storm demands international navies be ready to conduct battle group operations. The small-scale



deployment of amphibious ships, or patrol boat (PBCs) units may assist in counter-narcotic and security assistance training in the critical Central America region. Larger operations are generally unneeded in the South Atlantic region. Atlantic Fleet exercises, law enforcement operations, and new homeports along the Gulf coast are sufficient. Further, the President's emphasis on self-sufficiency in Latin America would make larger operations unwanted.

ENDURING PRINCIPLES

Obviously, careful evaluation of the peacetime applications of naval power can enhance the nation's security through more than the missions of deterrence and crisis response. The deliberate deployment principles are politically enabling. Assertion of unilateral U-S interest, affirmation of multi-lateral commitments, enhancement of regional stability, and promotion of free democratic principles are important objectives which must be considered in the planning process. Additionally, the responsive role's demand to react to crises and marshall capability cannot be ignored. Commitment to these principles enhances deployment plans and patterns.

Of course, these principles do not guarantee risk-free deployments, or stable deployment patterns. Periodically, deployed force capabilities may have to adjust to changing requirements and tasks. Continued reductions in overseas facilities, naval force structure, and budget authority will also



impact deployment schemes. Regional instabilities will continue to extend the nation's political and military resources. Yet, these uncertainties cannot be allowed to completely undermine the deployment planning process. The policy of "vigilant engagement" will not allow it. After all, "those grey, restless, innumerable ships...will constitute the universal, the flexible, the removable reminder of American power and concern." 18



APPENDIX I

Functions of Naval Forces on Deployment

Research revealed a variety of functions which naval forces can demonstrate through their operations. In general, these tasks and functions were fundamentally consistent regardless of the author. Functional highlights follow.

From Ken Booth's 'Roles, Objectives, and Tasks: An Inventory of the Function of Navies' in the Summer 1977 Naval War College Review, the following tasks are highlighted:

- Reassure and strengthen allies, associates, and friendly governments threatened by internal challenge or external attacks.
- Change the behavior of governments.
- Signal 'business as usual.'
- Support or threaten force from the sea to support friendly governments, or policy.
- Improve or manipulate bargaining strength, or negotiating ability.
- Demonstrate support, or gain or increase access to different countries.
- Build up foreign navies and create proxy threats.
- Create a degree of naval dependency.
- Provide standing demonstrations of naval power in distant waters to establish an interest right.
- Project psychological reassurance, a favorable general image, or an image of impressive naval force.
- Deter attack on the homeland and allies.
- Provide a secure situation to promote foreign policy interests.
- Prepare for wartime tasks.
- Deter hostile intrusion into maritime frontiers.
- Contribute to maritime stability.
- Protect or extend national sea claims.
- Protect maritime activities in international waters.
- Protect national lives, interests, and property in foreign lands, or when threatened by crises.
- Build up an overseas infrastructure.
- Demonstrate commitment to allies.
- Support internationally recognized laws of the sea.

From LCDR Kenneth R. McGruther's 'The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy,' in the September-October 1974 Naval War College Review, the following were highlighted:



- demonstration of will.
- instill a modicum of uncertainty.
- seize the political and military initiative.
- demonstrate crisis management ability.

From CDR James F. McNulty's 'Naval Presence - The Misunderstood Mission,' also in the September-October 1974 Naval War College Review, the following:

- support acknowledged international military commitments.
- confirm political commitments.
- demonstrate the capability of naval forces to move and act in support of unilateral or shared interests.
- assert continuing unilateral U-S interest in remote geographic areas.
- manifest credible warfighting capabilities in a specific geographic region.
- provide humanitarian aid when needed.
- coerce an opponent to comply with some preferred course of action.

Lastly, from Stansfield Turner's 'Missions of the U.S. Navy,' in the March-April 1974 Naval War College Review, three distinct functions:

- typical wartime tasks of sea control, sea denial, and power projection.
- deter actions inimical to U-S, or allied interests.
- encourage actions in support of U-S, or allied interests.

Clearly, despite the nuances of language, most deployment functions and objectives are consistent. Additionally, other works listed in the bibliography contain similar versions of peacetime tasks and objectives.



NOTES

1. Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III, et al., "The Way Ahead," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1991, p. 41.
2. Ibid., p. 41.
3. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy for the 1990's," Unpublished Draft, 8 October 1991, p. 14.
4. U.S. Navy Department, (OP-08), "The Necessity for Naval Power in the 1990s," Unpublished White Paper, 30 December 1989, p. 1.
5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 5.
6. James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1986, p. 38.
7. Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 6.
8. Edward Luttwak, "The Political Application of Naval Force," Naval War College Review, November-December 1973, p. 38.
9. U.S. President, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), August 1991, pp. 3-4.
10. Stanley Weeks, "Crafting a New Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1992, p. 32.
11. U.S. President, p. 27.
12. Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," Naval War College Review, March-April 1974, p. 14.
13. Ken Booth, "Roles, Objectives, and Tasks: An Inventory of the Function of Navies," Naval War College Review, Summer 1977, pp. 85-89.
14. CDR James F. McNulty, USN, "Naval Presence - The Misunderstood Mission," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, p. 26.
15. Ibid., p. 26.
16. Turner, p. 14.



17. Luttwak, "The Political Application of Naval Force,"
p. 38.

18. James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (New York:
St Martin's Press, 1981), p. 145.



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